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IV. THE OPENING OF THE UKRAINE

LONG BEFORE the Western world guessed his intentions Hitler had begun preparations for a campaign against the Soviet Union. As early as 1940 the Germans surreptitiously formed military training units for Ukrainians. Their enlistment was concealed by official statements that the units were for *Volksdeutsche* (ethnic Germans) only, and the purpose of the units was disguised by designating the Reichsarbeitdienst (Reich Labor Service) to be the supervising agency in the Generalgouvernement. Under this camouflage large numbers of Ukrainians were trained for police duty. More advanced training was carried out in Germany under direction of the Wehrmacht. In a number of camps instructors for future Ukrainian police units and interpreters for liaison with the German army were prepared.[1] At first, the chief Ukrainian organizer of this work was Colonel Sushko, and the training units were under the influence of the Mel'nyk group. After the split had fully developed, however, Bandera elements secured the upper hand in many of the groups, which were predominantly composed of young men fitted for active field service.[2]

Either because they were naturally interested in employing the young and physically qualified Ukrainians in the Bandera party for the forthcoming campaign, or because they were dissatisfied with the previous efforts of the OUN-M (Mel'nyk group) to pursue a somewhat independent course, the Germans turned more and more to the insurgent faction. This was especially the case when, in the early spring of 1941, the comparatively unconcealed development of Ukrainian units was begun by the Wehrmacht.

[1] Stepan (Stephen) Huliak, "Polk im. Kholodnoho Iaru v Rivnomu" (The Kholodnyi Iar Regiment in Rovno), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv l. UD UNA* (August-September, 1952), p. 7.

[2] MS D.

704 668* 725 The first such unit was known by the code name "Nachtigall" and was organized in the Generalgouvernement. Nominally, only its enlisted personnel were Ukrainian, while all officers were German. Actually, as the Germans well knew, there was a whole staff of "unofficial" Ukrainian officers, headed by the leader of the "military tendency" in the OUN-B, Roman Shukevych. At first "Nachtigall" had only about one hundred and fifty men, but at the outbreak of war it was expanded to battalion strength.[3]

A second unit, larger but of less political significance, was formed in Austria. Ukrainians were allowed a greater degree of formal authority than in "Nachtigall." In *de facto* command was Colonel Iarii, the dissident member of the old Provid, who was at once highly esteemed by his young subordinates and on the closest personal terms with the Abwehr officers charged with the formation of the units. John Gavrusevych, one of the top leaders of the Bandera group, was in charge of recruitment; his source of manpower lay in the large Ukrainian colony in Austria. Up to 1940, the chief Ukrainian organization in the latter territory was the student Sich in Vienna, which was dominated by the OUN. This association continued loyal to Mel'nyk, but most of the numerous Ukrainian factory workers turned to the new movement. It was among the latter that Gavrusevych secured the majority of his recruits, although about one quarter were secured from among the students, particularly those in the medical school in Graz. Care was taken to keep the force—which was called by the organizers Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists)—in the hands of the Bandera group, although only half of the members actually belonged to [714] the new party. Unlike "Nachtigall," which was clad in Wehrmacht *feldgrau*, "Roland," as the military unit composed of the Druzhyny was called, wore uniforms similar to those of the Galician section of the Ukrainian army of revolutionary days.[4]

668* As is apparent from the above description, the Wehrmacht units were prepared on a rather *ad hoc* basis, with the active

[3] Nykon Nalyvaiko, "Legiony v natsional'nykh viinakh" (Legions in National Wars), *Narod'na Volia* (October 27, 1949), p. 2.

[4] Liubomyr Ortyns'kyi, "Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (DUN)" (The Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists [DUN]), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv l. UD UNA* (June-July, 1952), p. 4; MS A.

668* northern task force reached Zhitomir, where it helped a group of local people set up a very impermanent administration, and aroused an equally transitory wave of enthusiasm among some of the younger citizens.[33] The southern force covered an even greater distance; it traveled across Galicia during July, carrying on propaganda work; reached Vinnitsa by the end of the month; and on September 2 was in Dniepropetrovsk (Katerynoslav or, more romantically, Sicheslav), five hundred miles from its starting point.[34]

668* Less picturesque, but of potentially greater value, were the military units under control of the Bandera group. As was previously noted, "Nachtigall" had taken part in the occupation of L'vov, where its leaders were of great value in organizing the city for the Bandera party. Although the Wehrmacht officers accompanying the group were aware of the roles of Father Hryn'okh, Shukevych, and Lopatyns'kyi in the *akt*, they protected them from the arrest.[35] The unit continued eastward with the Wehrmacht, in late August reaching Vinnitsa where its members made secret contact with the southern task force.[36]

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"Roland," on the other hand, had no direct connection with the activities in Galicia. Before the outbreak of war, it was sent across Hungary to the Rumanian part of Bukovina. There were considerable difficulties with the Rumanians because of efforts of the Ukrainian nationalists to establish contact with local Ukrainians who were Rumanian subjects. After the outbreak of war, however, the unit was sent with the German advance through Bessarabia, across the Dniester, and into the Ukrainian ethnographical territory north of Tiraspol' where it remained until early September.[37]

668* While the newest Ukrainian nationalist party was achieving widespread, though transitory successes, its chief rival was not idle. The defection of the bulk of the Galician youth had indeed dealt a heavy blow to the "legitimate" OUN under Mel'nyk. Nevertheless, it retained several very important assets. In the first place,

[33] Ievhen Stakhiv, p. 39.
[34] Matla, p. 9.
[35] Interview 63.
[36] *Ibid.*; Matla, pp. 9–10.
[37] Ortyns'kyi, p. 4; MS A.

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000 force under German aegis were frustrated by the Nazi contempt for the peoples of the East. Somewhat later, even as the organized nationalist forces were being suppressed, renewed hope arose that the Wehrmacht would insist on the building of a Ukrainian army. These Ukrainian expectations were not wholly unfounded, for the bitter experiences of the winter battles around Moscow and Kharkov and the growing Red partisan threat convinced many high army commanders that if the Soviet system was to be defeated help must be secured from the Kremlin's former subjects. A leader in this group was General von Schenkendorff, who proposed as early as March, 1942, that a national "Russian government" dependent on Germany should be formed to act as a
● 704 rallying point for native armed forces.[1] With the aid of officers moved less by sympathy for the aspirations of the East European peoples than by a willingness to grasp for promising expedients, *Hilfswillige* ("Hiwis," auxiliary) units and *Ostlegionen* were recruited by the Wehrmacht from among prisoners of war to carry on service operations for the army and to combat partisans. In the late winter of 1941–42, some of these units were used as independent detachments in the front line. The success of this experiment induced Wehrmacht circles to plan extensive employment of former Soviet troops.[2]

Men from the Caucasus and Central Asia were preferred as recruits by the Germans, but Slavs were also enlisted. The chief Slavic detachments seem to have been the "Cossack hundreds." These groups were linguistically and ethnically heterogeneous, for the name appealed at once to the traditions of the Ukrainians and to the Russian-speaking Cossacks of the Don and the Kuban. News of their employment spread quickly, and by May Ukrainian circles as far away as L'vov were convinced that the Germans had employed "Ukrainian" forces in the front line on the Isthmus of Kerch and that they would soon use Ukrainian troops in large numbers.[3] Closer to the zone of operation the stories were more

[1] PS 1685.
[2] PS 1686.
[3] Report from L'vov for week of May 22, 1942, contained in summary of Hauptabteilung Propaganda, Cracow, May 30, 1942, Occ E-2 (2), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-2 [2]). Cf. also a citation from *Vil'ne Slovo* (Drogobych), January 15, 1942, in *Nastup*, February 15, 1942, p. 4.

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precise; the Ukrainian newspapers in Kiev and Mariupol' reported that several Ukrainian detachments were fighting on the Crimean front, and even mentioned the name of a commander, while they observed that preparations were being made for training 150,000 Ukrainian soldiers.[4]

The ambitious plans of the Wehrmacht group soon encountered a most formidable obstacle. Hitler had a deep-seated antipathy toward granting the "inferior" and "untrustworthy" Slavs the right to bear arms. In August, 1942, he intervened personally to limit military utilization of volunteers from the Soviet nationalities to small anti-partisan formations.[5] The Wehrmacht officers did not abandon their long-range intentions of forming an army of former Soviet soldiers to help fight Stalin, but these leaders were forced to move cautiously. In the fall of 1942, their efforts became centered around Andrew Vlasov, an officer well known among the second echelon of Soviet generals, who had been captured a few months previously. The German officers envisaged him as the spokesman of all the anti-Communist elements from the Soviet Union. For a time they were successful in securing some support for Vlasov even in the Ostministerium, although Rosenberg never fully trusted him, since he knew Vlasov, a Russian, would not endorse the Rosenberg plan of partitioning the Soviet state.[6]

During the winter of 1942–43 Rosenberg and the army felt, though mistakenly, that there was a chance of gradually winning Hitler's sanction for a limited program of quasi-autonomy for the peoples of the occupied USSR, a step which would secure their active support for the war against their former rulers. At the same time that he was bolstering his shaky prestige by collaboration

[4] *Nastup*, February 15, 1942, p. 4, quoting *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo* for January 14, 1942; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 30, 1942, p. 3, quoting *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta*, No. 32.

[5] Directive No. 46 to Oberkommando der Wehrmacht on partisan fighting, from Führerhauptquartier, August 18, 1942, PS 477 (hereafter referred to as PS 477).

[6] Various aspects of the Vlasov movement have been thoroughly discussed in Jürgen Thorwald's *Wen sie verderben wollen* (Stuttgart: Steingrüben Verlag, 1952), George Fischer's *The Soviet Opposition to Stalin* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952), and in a forthcoming study on German policy toward the occupied USSR by Alexander Dallin. Consequently, no effort has been made to discuss this movement except insofar as it came into direct contact with the Ukrainian nationalists.

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000 with the Wehrmacht, Rosenberg also sought allies in the SS. His contacts there were utilized in March, 1943, in a scheme to form a "Ukrainian national representation" which, as envisaged by Rosenberg, would evidently have the dual purpose of securing greater Ukrainian support for the German war effort and preventing Vlasov's obtaining too important a role. Probably with the help of SS Brigadeführer Ohlendorf, Dr. Kinkelin, one of the higher officials of the Ostministerium, composed a list of four Kiev officials. A special effort was made to secure "pure Ukrainians" who were in close contact with the peasant. Remarkably enough, however, all four appear to have favored the Russophile element in Kiev municipal life.[7] The question of how such a "national committee" would have been received by nationalist Ukrainians went unanswered, for it remained a paper scheme. Whether its lack of reality was due to obstruction of the SS, which desired an instrument to reduce the partisan danger but continued to despise all Slavs, or whether it arose from Hitler's direct intervention is difficult to say.[8] At any rate, by the summer of 1943 the project had been dropped, along with the more grandiose plans for Vlasov's political activity.

● 704 668 The Ukrainians, however, who had looked with deep suspicion on the rise of Vlasov, now found in an unexpected quarter new encouragement in their hopes for a national army.[9] Although the SS continued to oppose the larger plans for arousing the Slavs against Communism, SS officers, extremely powerful in the Generalgouvernement, persuaded Himmler's coterie to authorize the large-scale recruitment of Galician Ukrainians for the Waffen SS. The continued outward loyalty of the population of Galicia, which made the province, prior to Kovpak's incursion, one of the most peaceful of Germany's conquests, was a powerful argument in favor of concessions to the West Ukrainians. Europeans

[7] They were Vadym Maikovs'kyi, Theodore Babak, Volodymyr Labuts'kyi, and George Kandiïv. Temporary list of members for a Ukrainian National Committee, by Dr. Kinkelin, CXLVa 77, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 77).

[8] The latter's decision to restrict Vlasov operations was made about this time. See George Fischer, "Vlasov and Hitler," *Journal of Modern History*, XXIII (March, 1951), 64.

[9] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, May 30, 1943, p. 3.

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classified as "Nordics" were already enrolled in special military formations under Himmler. This new departure in SS policy, made at a time when the higher SS officials were toying with the idea of backing a Ukrainian national representation, enabled the "inferior" Slavs to secure a footing in the ranks of the elite troops.

The creation of SS Division Galicia, as the unit was called, was hedged about with restrictions. The word "Ukrainian" was excluded from the designation. Overt reference to "political" implications of the formation was rigorously forbidden.[10] Nevertheless, the creation of the division was supported by most of the leading elements in Galicia. Formation of the division was officially announced on May 4, 1943, when the president of the Ukrainian Central Committee, Kubiiovych, issued a proclamation urging its support.[11] While Colonel Sushko was not active in the new project,[12] General Kurmanovych spoke in favor of the division on the L'vov radio.[13] Other Mel'nyk supporters like Michael Khronoviat played leading roles in its development, and pro OUN-M organs gave it great publicity.[14] The position of the rival nationalist group was less clear. Being illegal, the OUN-B could not take part openly in the drive to establish the military unit even had it desired to do so. Since the war, Bandera supporters have used this circumstance to maintain that they always opposed this form of collaboration with the Germans, and have denounced the other nationalist groups for supporting it. It is fairly clear, however, that while the OUN-B did not officially countenance the project, or lend extensive support, it did not really work against the creation of the division. Shukevych is said

[10] Interview 70. A letter (in the possession of Dr. Liubomyr Makarushka) from Bauer to Schenk and Bisantz (all officials in the Generalgouvernement), dated August 18, 1943, states that Makarushka should be warned against ascribing political importance to the "military council" formed in connection with the organization of the division.

[11] This proclamation was printed in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 6, 1943, p. 1. It recalled the heroic feats of the Ukrainian Galician Army and the students who defended Kiev at Kruty; at the same time it appealed to realism and national interest and emphasized the Bolshevik danger. It warned that the matter was a case of "now or never."

[12] Evidently out of pique because he was not given a leading role (Interview 36).

[13] *Nastup*, May 16, 1943, p. 2.

[14] *Ibid.*; *Nastup*, May 23, 1943, p. 6, and May 30, 1943, p. 3.

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to have felt that it offered a valuable opportunity for Ukrainian youths to secure military training.[15] This would be in accord with his well-known proclivity for emphasizing the technical military needs of the nationalist movement, and it is the more plausible because just at that time his efforts to build up the UPA were being severely hampered by a dearth of young officers. In order to obtain cadres for future operations, and in order to prevent the new unit from falling into the hands of those opposed to OUN-B aims, he ordered a considerable number of his followers to enter its ranks, where they occupied prominent positions;[16] other Bandera adherents, attracted by the opportunity for active service, joined without such authorization.[17]

The Galician Division, however, never came under the control of either OUN party to the same extent as had the earlier German-organized Ukrainian formations. The prime organizer and highest ranking Ukrainian officer in it (the commanding staff was German) was Dmytro Paliïv, formerly a leader of one of the smaller legal parties in Poland.[18] With him were associated a large number of UNDO members like Liubomyr Makarushka,[19] while numerous old UNR officers like Generals Petriv[20] and Omelianovych-Pavlenko[21] lent their moral support.

The almost universal support given to a creation of the SS, the very organization which had done most to suppress Ukrainian nationalism, was reinforced in the spring of 1943 by the view which most Ukrainian nationalists took of the future course of events. Much as they hated the Nazis, and little as they hoped for real help from them, they hated and feared the Communists still more. That the prospects of German victory, never very high after the failure to take Moscow, were extremely remote was apparent to all after the winter of Stalingrad. Many Ukrainian

[15] Bohdan Pidhainyi, "Dva shliakhy—odna meta" (Two Routes—One Goal), in Oleh Lysiak (ed.), *Brody: Zbirnyk stattei i narysiv* (Brody: A Collection of Articles and Sketches) (Munich: Bratstvo kol. Voiakiv Pershoï UD UNA, 1951), p. 59.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] Interview 58.

[18] Interviews 36, 58.

[19] Interview 70; *Nastup*, May 16, 1943, p. 2.

[20] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 9, 1943, p. 1.

[21] Myroslav Martynets', "Gen.-Polk. M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko" (Colonel-General Omelianovych-Pavlenko), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA* (August-September, 1952), p. 1.

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leaders hoped for a protracted struggle in which both of the totalitarian powers would be so weakened that they would be forced to surrender their domination of Eastern Europe. They thought that Great Britain and the United States, in accordance with either the plain meaning of the Atlantic Charter or elementary principles of the balance of power, would prevent the complete subjugation of this area by the Soviet Union. What they anticipated was a period of anarchy in the area between Russia and Germany, like that of 1918, in which the nation which possessed organized military forces would be able to assert itself. Some felt that the UPA could fill this need, but many felt that in view of the UPA's low military value the nationalist movement must seize the chance to form a real army under German auspices which could later be used independently, even against its sponsors.[22]

The nationalist leaders were also encouraged to support the Galician Division by certain favorable conditions which they exacted from the Germans. According to Nationalist accounts, the unit was to be used only against the Soviet forces and never against the Western Allies; thus it would be in a position, they thought, to come to terms with the latter when the opportunity arose. Whether or not the Germans officially agreed to this stipulation, it is certain that the condition was observed. More significantly, the political training and indoctrination of the soldiers, instead of being in the hands of Nazi ideologists, was left to the

[22] See especially Nykon Nalyvaiko, "Legiony v natsionalnykh viinakh" (Legions in National Wars), *Narodna Volia*, October 27, 1949, p. 2, and November 3, 1949, p. 3; Ivan Hryn'okh, "Dyviziia Halychyna i ukraïns'ke pidpillia" (The Galician Division and the Ukrainian Underground), in *Brody*, pp. 52 ff.; and the clandestine publication, *Za Samostiinu Ukraïnu*, No. 9, December 10, 1943, which gives the official position of the "Third Extraordinary Great Congress of the OUN [B]" on the role of Ukrainian forces in the event of German collapse. The Bandera followers stated that the Western Allies (especially Britain) wanted a prolongation of the war on the eastern front with mutual weakening of Germany and the Soviet Union, so that they could have a free hand on the continent. They continued that Moscow, being discredited in the eyes of the eastern nations, could not maintain its imperialism, a circumstance which gave the Ukraine an opportunity to become the natural leader of these peoples. It is significant that, while the report of this conference called for struggle against Germany and glorified the UPA, in other places it emphasized repeatedly the need for armed forces without specifying that they be insurgent. There was no condemnation of the Galician Division.

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nationalist leadership. Moreover, in contrast to the usual Waffen SS practice, each detachment was allowed its chaplain.[23]

The considerations just discussed played a considerable part in securing the support of both the Autocephalous Orthodox Church[24] and the Greek Catholic Church for the formation of the Galician Division. Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi had originally greeted the German army as a liberator from Communist tyranny. He soon discovered that the Wehrmacht officers, with whom he at first established cordial relations, were not the real representatives of German power. The horrible excesses of the SP, especially its massacre of thousands of Jews, caused a sharp change in Sheptyts'kyi's attitude. He was especially alarmed by the SP use of Ukrainian police for their murders, and is said to have sent a direct demand to Himmler that this practice be stopped. At any rate, a secret report to the German foreign office provides almost conclusive evidence that the Metropolitan was adamantly opposed to the Nazi anti-Semitic outrages and that by late 1943 he had come to regard Nazism as even a greater evil than Communism.[25] Nevertheless, he personally favored the creation of the Galician Division, and sent one of his clergy, Dr. Laba, to act as chief chaplain.[26] Bishop Joseph Slipyi conducted a service in St. George

[23] Interviews 46, 58, 63.

[24] The son of Mstyslav (Skrypnyk), the vicarial bishop of Kiev, joined the division; see Report by an unidentified official of the Ostministerium to Rosenberg, June 30, 1944, CXLVa 66, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 66).

[25] CXLVa 60. This document was submitted as a secret report, under the pseudonym "Dr. Frédéric," to the German foreign office by a fairly well-known French student of East Europe, who had become an active collaborator with the Germans. On a visit to L'vov in the late summer of 1943 this man talked with a number of Ukrainians, including the Metropolitan. The report appears to reflect the Metropolitan's attitudes accurately, and in large measure substantiates accounts such as those of Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), pp. 114–115, and Father Mykhailo Sopuliak, "Pam'iati velykoho Mytropolyta" (Memories of the Great Metropolitan), *Chas*, December 14, 1947, p. 3. This, and the following paragraph, is also based on Il'ko (Elie) Borshchak, *Un Prélat Ukrainien: Le Metropolite Cheptyskyj (1865–1944)* (Paris: Editions Franco-Ukrainiennes, 1946), pp. 55–56; and on Interview 63.

[26] SS Obergruppenführer Berger to Himmler, July 26, 1943, HH 263, in Hoover Library. The same file contains a sermon delivered by Father Laba in which he calls upon the Galicians to help "Hitler and the German people" destroy Bolshevism. An accompanying letter from Berger to another SS official, Brandt (July 22, 1943), notes that Laba's sermons contain "dangerous expressions," but that "we will soon pull this tooth." Himmler's own attitude is indicated by Brandt's

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Cathedral in L'vov, celebrating the inauguration of the division.[27] 000

German permission to provide chaplains and the absence of Nazi indoctrination among the soldiers helped make the unit acceptable to the church. The chief reason which induced the Metropolitan to sanction the project, however, was similar to that which motivated other nationalist leaders. He felt that German defeat was only a matter of time and that the small military support which the division could provide for the faltering Wehrmacht could not be decisive. At the same time, he thought the existence of a nationalist military force of some strength would be invaluable in the chaos which would succeed a German collapse and might even be necessary to preserve the lives of a considerable portion of the Ukrainian population of Galicia. Sheptyts'kyi's chief concern in this connection was aroused by extremist elements among the Poles who were killing their opponents among the Ukrainians, just as the OUN-B was slaughtering Poles in Volhynia.

More than twelve months were spent in recruiting and organizing the division. The response of the young men to the call for enlistment was so great that the quota set for the unit was overfilled many times, and tens of thousands had to be rejected.[28] Nevertheless, the SS officers in control appear to have been suspicious of the loyalty of their command and hesitant to use it. Meanwhile, the Nazis' vast conquests in the Ukraine were falling into the hands of the Red Army. In March, 1943, the Soviet forces took Kharkov, only to lose it in May. They captured Kharkov once again, and September, 1943, brought them from Kharkov to the gates of Kiev. There they halted a month, but the remaining fall and winter of 1943–44 ended with the reconquest of practically all of the pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine, plus most of Volhynia. 704

It was not until the summer of 1944 that the real battle for Galicia was joined. At this point, the SS command finally decided to commit the new Ukrainian division to battle. The front

statement that his chief was willing to use the influence of the clergy in the division, but that if they began to agitate they would be thrown out, and the Metropolitan himself would have to bear part of the consequences.

[27] *Nastup*, May 16, 1943, p. 2.

[28] Interview 44.

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704 ran from just east of Kovel to a point in the Carpathians south of Ternopol'; a key point was the little town of Brody, on the main highway from Rovno to L'vov. Here, in late June, the SS division was put into the line to assist in covering the Galician capital. For three weeks it maintained its position, in the face of fierce Soviet attacks and encircling operations, but by July 20 was no longer effective as a fighting unit. Perhaps 20 percent of its complement fell back with the German armies toward the Carpathians, and half of the remainder escaped to join the UPA or to filter back to the German lines.[29]

661 798 After the victory of Brody, the Red Army rapidly conquered east Galicia, Bukovina, and the Carpatho-Ukraine. By fall, substantially all of the Ukrainian lands were again under the dominion of Moscow. This time the repression exercised by the Communist rulers was harsher and less disguised than it had been five years before. The Greek Catholic Church was attacked ruthlessly. Bishop Slipyi, who had succeeded Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi after the latter's death in late 1944, was arrested and deported to the interior of the Soviet Union. Most of the hierarchy of the Greek Catholic Church, as well as hundreds of its clergy, were likewise banished. Orthodox priests subservient to the Patriarch of Moscow enlisted the aid of a minority of the Greek Catholic clergy, who renounced their allegiance to Rome and joined in constructing a new hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church in Galicia. The same tactics were pursued in the Carpatho-Ukraine.[30]

[702] 661 According to reports of refugees from the area, very severe measures were taken against the population at large. Men from the ages of eighteen to fifty are said to have been drafted into the Red Army in a mass, without regard for their state of health.[31] Once enlisted, they were said to be watched over by special *politruks*, given inferior arms, and sent into battle after eight

[29] See numerous contributions to *Brody*, and *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA*, for detailed descriptions of military operations of this battle and of the other Ukrainian forces serving with the Wehrmacht.

[30] Cf. Baran, *Mytropolyt*, pp. 137 ff.; Mykola D. Chubatyi, "Russian Church Policy in the Ukraine," *Ukrainian Quarterly*, I (Autumn, 1945), 51–53.

[31] SS war reporter Oleh Lysiak in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 2, 1944, p. 3.

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Za Ukraïnu, were kept in the hands of nationalist editors, who were able to direct oblique attacks on Vlasov.[63]

Nevertheless, it is certain that Vlasov was given some advantages, and secured considerable success, in his efforts to recruit prisoners of war of all Soviet nationalities for his Russian Liberation Army (Rossiskaia Osvoboditelnaia Armiia—ROA). Even according to Ukrainian nationalist sources, only half of the prisoners of Ukrainian origin were fully "nationally conscious," and many could not even speak the Ukrainian language.[64] Moreover, Vlasov was able to secure a number of high-ranking ex-Soviet officers of Ukrainian origin for his staff, including the commander of the first ROA division, General Buniachenko. Altogether, units, in various stages of integration in the ROA, totaled three hundred thousand by January, 1945, and of this number perhaps 35 to 40 percent were of Ukrainian ethnic stock.[65]

Apparently no direct threats or compulsion were used to secure adherence of civilians to the KONR.[66] On the other hand, Ukrainian nationalist sources maintain that the apparent German favor enjoyed by Vlasov was a powerful inducement to the de-

[62] For example, the latter newspaper published the translation of an article from *Das Schwartze Korps* (an SS organ) harshly criticizing Russian émigrés, on January 18, 1945, p. 2.

[63] M. Les', "Chomu ia buv 'Vlasovtsem'?" (Why was I a "Vlasovite"?), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA* (October-November, 1952), p. 3, states that 50 percent of the Ukrainian prisoners were "nationally conscious," 40 percent somewhat so, and 10 percent not at all. A contemporary account (*Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 23, 1941, p. 2) states that many of the letters addressed by Ukrainian prisoners to the newspaper which the Germans had established for them (*Nova Doba*) were in Russian, but notes that they were sent to the Ukrainian rather than the Russian paper, *Klich.* The latter also carried material evidently intended for a Ukrainian audience. Other contemporary accounts of the prisoners differ as to whether they could speak the Ukrainian language. One insists that 80 percent were "nationally conscious," and that the Russian prisoners accepted the fact that the Ukrainians were "separatists" without anger, for while the latter wanted an independent state they had always lived peacefully with the Russians and other minorities in the Ukraine (*Krakivs'ki Visti,* December 5, 1941, p. 2).

[64] Unsigned list of units from the eastern peoples, January, 1945, NO 5800 (hereafter referred to as NO 5800). For the percentage of Ukrainians see Les', p. 3, and MS H, which states that Vlasov told Shandruk that 70 percent of the first ROA division were Ukrainians. If so, this figure must have been reached by including persons with very little Ukrainian nationalist feeling whom the Russian National Socialist leader, Bronislav Kaminskii, recruited in the Lokot' area on the border of the Ukrainian and Russian Soviet Republics, since (according to Thorwald, p. 44) Kaminskii's brigade alone formed more than a third of this division.

[65] Interview 45.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

moralized and physically worn-out prisoners to accept his invitation as a way out of confinement. They assert that a number of the units formed from prisoners or from the auxiliary units brought back by the Wehrmacht in its retreat abandoned the ROA, even without German permission, to join nationalist Ukrainian forces.[67] To a certain degree, this assertion is supported by one of the German officers most closely associated with the eastern military units, who states that difficulties were experienced in subordinating Ukrainian or mixed Ukrainian-Russian units which had been under German commanders to Russian officers from the ROA, although there was generally no objection to attachment to Vlasov's over-all command.[68]

In addition to this struggle for influence within groups which were subordinated to General Vlasov, there was an entirely separate military organization for the Ukrainians. The Galician division was reformed as the First Ukrainian Division, and organization of a second division to be composed of East Ukrainians was begun.[69] These and a number of other units, totaling seventy-five thousand men, were classified as the Ukrainian Liberation Army (Ukraïns'ke Vyzvol'ne Voisko—UVV) under command of General Shandruk, though each unit was actually commanded by a German officer.[70] In contradistinction to the ROA units, which wore the St. Andrew's cross, a centuries-old Russian symbol, the Ukrainian units were permitted the *trizub* [trident] as their national emblem. Borovets', who had been released from prison after a few months, was commissioned to form a parachute detachment to land behind the Soviet lines to aid the partisan struggle.[71]

The final days of the war brought no substantial change in

[67] A. Kovach, *Ukraïns'ka vyzvol'na borot'ba i "Vlasovshchyna"* (The Ukrainian Liberation Struggle and the "Vlasov Affair") ("Germany," 1948), p. 51, states that 65 percent of the trainees in the Dabensdorf officers' school of the ROA were of Ukrainian origin.

[68] Interview 15; MS C.

[69] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 8, 1944, p. 3.

[70] General Shandruk has in his possession a mimeographed copy of an order from the German general, Freitag, turning over command of the First (Galician) Ukrainian Division to him, but only on April 27, 1945. See also Oleh Lysiak, "Volyns'kyi Batalion" (The Volhynian Battalion), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA* (March, 1951), p. 2.

[71] Borovets', *Zboroina borot'ba*, p. 15; Interview 37.